John Gomez v. James Markley by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-21-2012 
John Gomez v. James Markley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"John Gomez v. James Markley" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 554. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/554 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-2074 & 11-2556 
___________ 
 
JOHN GOMEZ, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICER JAMES MARKLEY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-00868) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 17, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 21, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 John Paul Gomez sued James Markley and the Midway Borough Police 
Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other claims, a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop in March 2007.  The District Court 
concluded that it appeared that Gomez challenged three searches, one when he was 
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removed from his vehicle and searched for weapons, one when Markley searched the 
vehicle for drugs and/or contraband, and one when his car was inventoried when it was 
taken into police custody.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on all three claims (and also dismissed Gomez’s other claims).  Gomez 
appealed.  We vacated the judgment against Markley as to the Fourth Amendment claim 
about the second search, but otherwise affirmed the District Court’s decision.  Gomez v. 
Markley, 385 F. App’x 79, 82-3 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2010).  On remand, the claim about the 
second search was tried before a jury, which found that there was no second search and 
returned a verdict in favor of Markley.   
 Gomez appeals.
1
  His main argument is that the District Court violated our 
mandate on remand by allowing the parties to try, and the jury to consider, whether the 
second search had taken place.  (He contends that proper question for the jury was 
whether Markley had probable cause to conduct a second search.)  He also challenges 
some of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and a post-trial decision that a motion for 
the District Court “to render judgment” was moot.  Lastly, he contends that the District 
Court should have granted his “motion for a new trial and/or judgment not withstanding 
[sic] the verdict.” 
                                              
1
 Gomez first appealed from the judgment entered after the jury verdict (C.A. No. 11-
2074).  He later filed another appeal (C.A. No. 11-2556) to appeal from a later ruling on 
post-trial motions (although he also challenged another order relating to the cost of the 
transcript of his trial, we do not consider it, for we resolved the transcript issue 
previously, and Gomez no longer pursues the matter, see Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)).  The two appeals have been consolidated for all purposes.    
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether the District Court 
properly interpreted and applied our mandate is a question of law, which, like any other 
question of law in this case, is subject to plenary review.  See Kilbarr Corp. v. Business 
Sys., 990 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1993).  The District Court’s rulings on whether to admit 
or exclude evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion (as long as they are based on a 
permissible interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).  Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 
550, 553 (3d Cir. 2003).  We consider whether a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
should have been granted under the same standard employed by the District Court; it 
should have been granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other 
than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law.”  See McGreevy v. 
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court’s ruling on the motion to 
grant a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion (unless the ruling was based on the 
application of a legal precept).  Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 Upon review of our earlier decision and the proceedings on remand, we conclude 
that the District Court did not violate our mandate.  In our earlier opinion, we did say, as 
Gomez notes, that “[t]he District Court determined that three searches occurred.”  
Gomez, 385 F. App’x at 82.  We also described a second search when we stated that, if 
the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to Gomez, they “are still not sufficient 
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to support a finding as a matter of law that Officer Markley had probable cause to believe 
that there were drugs in the car before he commenced his search.”  Id. at 83.   
However, the procedural context of our earlier ruling is important.  We were 
considering the case at the summary judgment stage.  As we just noted above and as we 
also noted at the outset of our earlier opinion, we were construing “all facts in the light 
most favorable to [Gomez] as the non-moving party,” Gomez, 385 F. App’x at 80, as the 
District Court had been obliged to do, too.  Through the same lens, the District Court had 
concluded that there were three searches at issue (although, even at that stage, the District 
Court expressed doubt about the second search, stating “to the extent it happened . . . [it] 
amounted to a search for contraband”).  District Court Memorandum of July 18, 2008, at 
p. 15.  Accepting that the second search occurred, we held that if all the evidence 
presented at the summary judgment stage was construed in favor of Gomez, then Markley 
did not have probable cause to search the car for drugs.  However, our ruling did not 
establish for all purposes and all time that there had been a second search.  Our ruling, 
which vacated the grant of summary judgment on the second search claim, remanded the 
matter to the District Court for further development of the case.  Gomez, 385 F. App’x at 
83.  The District Court’s decision to allow Gomez’s claim about a second search to be 
tried before a jury was entirely appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with 
our mandate.    
We also discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s challenged rulings 
on evidentiary issues.  We have reviewed each ruling and find a sound basis for each in 
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the record.  For instance, the District Court did not err in precluding Gomez from 
introducing evidence that was inadmissible hearsay or irrelevant to the issue being tried.  
Similarly, the District Court committed no error in requiring, variously, and as necessary, 
authentication, documentation in compliance with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and compliance with disclosure requirements to the opposing party.      
Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it ruled that a 
motion for the District Court “to render judgment” was moot.  In February 2011, the jury 
came to its verdict and the judgment was entered on the docket (subsequently, Gomez 
engaged in post-trial motions practice).  On April 15, 2011, Gomez filed his motion for 
the District Court “to render judgment.”  On the same day, the District Court denied the 
motion as moot, as judgment had already been entered.  That ruling was correct. 
Lastly, we hold that the District Court properly denied  Gomez’s “motion for a 
new trial and/or judgment not withstanding [sic] the verdict.”  As the District Court 
noted, the motion was untimely filed under Rules 50(b) and 59(b), which set a time-limit 
of 28 days for the motions allowed under those rules.
 2
  Furthermore, Gomez’s motion 
was based largely on his primary argument on appeal, which we considered above.  
Finally, after considering the trial transcript and the evidence presented in the case, we 
                                              
2
 An additional procedural obstacle to success on the motion for judgment as a matter of 
law is Gomez’s apparent failure to file such a motion at the close of the evidence.  See 
Brokerage Concepts v. U.S. Healthcare, 140 F.3d 494, 519 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining 
that a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure must be preceded by a motion under Rule 50(a)).   
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conclude that judgment in Gomez’s favor as matter of law was not warranted.    For these 
reasons, in this consolidated appeal, we will affirm.   
 
